(CLASSIFICATION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 28				
DATE	30	July 1962	-	

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES

LBK/jrc	
Distribution:	
l - to each addressee	
1 - Mr. (For info.)	
1 - DDCI (for info.)	
1 - Executive Director	

EXECUTE In fee Day

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In view of the possible resumption of Soviet nuclear tests at any time, the DCI has asked the members of the United States Intelligence Board to alert all appropriate facilities so as to obtain the most complete information possible whenever such tests occur.

The DCI has also cautioned the Board members to take all feasible steps to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information regarding any Soviet nuclear tests, in order to provide essential protection of the intelligence sources and methods used in obtaining this information. Controls on the dissemination of information regarding foreign nuclear explosions are established by a Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/6. This directive specifically provides that no public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made, except as directed by the President or the National Security Council.

In view of the great importance of safeguarding intelligence sources and methods used in detecting such foreign nuclear tests, however, the DCI has suggested with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board that a Presidential directive be issued reaffirming that no public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear weapons tests will be made except as specifically authorised by the President.

The distribution of such a directive should include, in addition to the departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council and the United States Intelligence Board, the United States Information Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Public Health Service and the Weather Bureau, all of whom receive information regarding these tests.

(In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, and its important implications, members of the Executive Committee should be aware of the action the DCI has taken.)